

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ESDP – SECURITY OR CONSEQUENCES

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ABSTRACT

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The European Union (EU) has committed itself to creating a common foreign and security policy for Europe. Formally established in 1999, this strategic program is designated the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Since its inception, ESDP has been heralded as a practical institution dedicated to promoting and managing the EU's global and regional security programs. As the ESDP initiative progresses toward its final goal of a European armed force a close examination of its strategic impacts on Europe and the transatlantic is necessary. Will the completion of ESDP enhance global and regional European security as planned or will it create unintended consequences weakening the security of Europe and altering its transatlantic relationships? This paper will examine the security fallout of ESDP and its effect on the major strategic actors on the European continent; the EU, the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as exploring ESDP's decision making process and its search for global credibility. Finally this paper will reflect on the future of ESDP and its mission of providing a common foreign and security policy for Europe.

ESDP – SECURITY OR CONSEQUENCES

The European Union (EU) has committed itself to creating a common foreign and security policy for Europe. Formally established in 1999, this strategic program is designated the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Since its inception, ESDP has been heralded as a practical institution dedicated to promoting and managing the EU's global and regional security interests. As the ESDP initiative progresses toward its final goal of a common European Security Strategy (ESS), with a collective autonomous military force, a close examination of its strategic impacts on Europe and its transatlantic alliances is necessary. Will completion of the ESDP objectives enhance global and regional European security as anticipated, or will it create unintended consequences weakening the security of Europe and altering its transatlantic relationships? This paper will examine the security fallout of ESDP and its effect on the major strategic actors on the European continent, the EU, the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, this paper will reflect on the future of ESDP and examine its goal of providing a common foreign and security policy for Europe.

ESDP – In the Beginning

In 1991, Western Europe and the world watched in horror as civil war and humanitarian disaster ignited and spread throughout Yugoslavia. Ethnic cleansing, mass murders, and wanton destruction were rapidly destabilizing the political and security structures of the entire Balkan region. As first responders to the crisis, Western European states struggled feverishly to solve the complicated national and ethnic problems dominating the conflict. After three years of bloody fighting, the leaders of Europe and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had very little progress to show for its effort, and assistance was required to quell the increasing violence. The United States acting through NATO stepped up and by December 1995 had established a framework for peace known formally as The Dayton Peace Accords. The arrangement deployed 60,000 NATO soldiers into the region, and under U.S. leadership, the force separated the combatants and enforced the brokered peace. The United States, with a credible military force and hard nosed diplomacy, accomplished in three weeks at Dayton what the United Nations and the Europeans had failed to achieve in three years.¹ The appalling performance of the UN in resolving the crisis forced the leaders of Europe to rethink their regional security strategy and their military capability.²

Again in 1998, the Balkan region erupted in violence as Kosovo and Serbia engaged in an insurgency. The EU was once more unable to negotiate an end to the violence and another American led NATO task force, this time relying heavily on advanced U.S. targeting and delivery

systems, deployed to stabilize the region. Assessing their position after both conflicts, the leaders of Europe arrived at two distinct imperatives: first, conflict resolution required a hard power option and second, without an autonomous military force, Europe could not intervene in a regional conflict without first consulting with NATO and ultimately the United States. Armed with this knowledge, European leaders were forced to reevaluate their security and defense strategies and postulate how a unified Europe should position itself for the security challenges of the 21st century. The sweeping question remained: did Europe require its own common defense and security policy, including an autonomous military capability, or was the current NATO and U.S. security guarantee still relevant?

By 1998, the states of Europe had determined it was in their strategic interest to create a credible security and defense policy, to include a military capability, to respond independently to regional and international events. At the Saint-Malo Summit in December 1998, the leaders of Europe agreed on the need for a security structure to be established within the EU that was capable of independent action backed by a credible military force.³ In June 1999 at the European Council in Cologne, the EU launched the ESDP initiative to provide a framework for a common European security program and to develop a military and police force to respond to international and regional crises.⁴ The platform carried the necessary caveat that any autonomous actions by the EU would not interfere with any ongoing NATO operations.⁵ After Cologne the process moved ahead rapidly. By the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999, the EU formally announced the ESDP. It also established a military “Headline Goal” of creating by late 2003 a corps-level Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 troops that could be deployable within 60 days with the ability to sustain operations for up to a year.⁶ The force would be organized to accomplish a series of crisis management tasks originally outlined in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration. These tasks range from low end humanitarian and rescue operations, to peacekeeping operations, and finally to employing combat forces in peacemaking missions.⁷ These stated goals, if implemented as outlined, would provide the EU with the security organization and a credible military force to plan and execute independent European security and defense operations.⁸

Before ESDP could be fully realized, EU faced resolving several difficult security and primacy issues with NATO and the United States. For ESDP to be successful, the EU would need two major concessions from NATO and the United States. They would need access to the European military units in NATO, and they would require, at least initially, strategic and operational level transportation, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and logistical

assets.⁹ At the Washington NATO Summit in late 1999, NATO, the U.S., and EU agreed on a compromise framework known as "Berlin Plus." The main points of Berlin Plus were:

- EU would have assured access to NATO operational planning capabilities
- Presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets
- Identification of an assortment of NATO European command options for EU-led operations, to include a command role for the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR)
- Adoption of the NATO defense planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU-led operations¹⁰

Within this framework, EU continued to promote and develop ESDP. At a 1999 State of the NATO Alliance address, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot acknowledged the new ESDP capability, but restated the U.S. position on NATO primacy:

Helsinki represented, from our perspective, a step ... in the right direction. We welcome Helsinki's focus on improving European military capabilities, its recognition of NATO's central role in collective defense and crisis management and that the EU can act "where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged." We hope that as ESDP moves from the realm of an acronym to that of reality, it will continue to assume both form and substance that increase its chances for its own success and therefore for our continuing support.¹¹

Since January 1, 2003 the EU has participated in three military operations: a civilian-military policing action in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it relieved a United Nations task force; a peace management operation in Macedonia where it replaced a NATO force; and a peacekeeping operation in Bunia in Central Africa as part of a larger UN operation.¹² Although these operations were small in scope, they provided the EU with valuable experience in peacekeeping operations and crisis management.¹³ Additionally, EU gained confidence that its common security system was feasible and sustainable.

Despite the failure of EU member states to meet fully their 2003 Headline Goal targets the future of ESDP appeared headed in the right direction after its successfully partnering with NATO and effectively conducting several minor military operations. However, its potential was severely rattled in the spring of 2003 when EU splintered on supporting the United States-led war with Iraq. The painful divide had many Europeans speculating that ESDP was a dead program.¹⁴ In the aftermath, senior European Union leaders were left to question whether they could ever develop a common security strategy that would satisfy the wide ranging defense policies of its diverse member states. To reenergize the ESDP initiative, the EU needed to decide jointly what it perceived as threats and to develop a common strategy to meet the new global challenges. In December 2003, the EU published one of its most important strategic

security and defense documents, the European Security Strategy (ESS). Drafted by Javier Solana, this document clearly defined the common threats and strategic objectives of the EU.

The ESS outlines five specific threats confronting the common European community: First and foremost, terrorism “poses a growing strategic risk to the whole of Europe.”¹⁵ Global terrorists are well connected, fully resourced and willing to use extreme violence to attain their goals.¹⁶ Second, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is potentially the greatest threat to the security of Europe, where non-state actors can inflict damage on a grand scale formerly possible by large states only.¹⁷ Third, regional conflicts, both globally and locally, impact the security of Europe. These conflicts, if left unabated, fuel extremism, terrorism and organized crime, all of which threaten the safety of Europe.¹⁸ Fourth, failed or failing states create political vacuums often filled by terrorists and opportunists that undermine global governance and add to regional instability.¹⁹ Finally, organized crime threatens the internal security of Europe, and if left unchecked, can create tremendous political and social problems.

Understanding the threat, the ESS next outlines three strategic objectives to protect and support the values of Europe.²⁰ First, it is essential that Europe build security in its own neighborhood by aggressively resolving regional conflicts and engaging regional actors on security, economic, cultural, and social issues. Second, Europe must continue to support and endorse the multilateral political, military and financial systems that are the foundation of a rule-based international order.²¹ Finally, the EU must instill greater cooperation amongst its members and the United States across the spectrum of threats.²²

Security of Consequences

As ESDP continues to mature and the EU realizes its ESS objectives, how will European regional and global security be impacted? Will this new institution live up to its charter and provide the EU with a common security strategy? Or, to the contrary, will unforeseen problems overwhelm ESDP endangering the security of Europe? This segment will analyze the key financial, political and social impacts of ESDP on EU member states and examine their affect on common security strategy for Europe.

Financial Considerations

Establishing and maintaining a common European security policy will require a commensurate resource commitment from EU member states. In order for ESDP to enhance regional and global security, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) must have the budget, modern equipment, and force structure to conduct military operations as directed by the EU. An autonomous ESDP, which is not reliant on American military assets, will require an EU

commitment to transforming its current “Cold War” force structure into an expeditionary configuration with significant investments in intelligence, communications, transportation, and military hardware. Additionally, the EU member states will have to commit to annual defense expenditures that will sustain their military forces over the long term. A strategic objective not in balance with its means will encounter feasibility and sustainability problems over the long term. This chapter will explore the foreseeable political, economic, and security environment effecting Europe and determine if the EU is willing and able to fund adequately its ESDP initiative. Or will endemic capability shortfalls and lackluster military expenditures consign the ESDP security force to Paper Tiger status?²³

Committing resources for a common European security policy will require a considerable political and financial obligation from every EU member state. Funding a realistic force on first blush, does not seem overly excessive. In 2004, the 25 member states of the EU had a common defense budget of \$186.3 billion representing 1.7 percent of their collective Gross National Product (GDP). Although this is still less than half the defense expenditures of the United States, with outlays of \$453.6 billion amounting to 3.7 percent of its GDP, it should be adequate to equip and train a credible, autonomous collective military force.²⁴ Furthermore, there are currently over two million soldiers filling the ranks of EU member states, compared with only 1.4 million under arms in the U.S. This large resource pool should be sufficient to form a strategic force with the mobility and firepower to meet the global threats of the 21st century.²⁵ A recent RAND Corporation study estimates that to transform a portion of Europe’s military force to a 60,000 man expeditionary Corps, as envisioned by ESDP, would require capital investment of between \$70 and \$75 billion U.S. dollars.²⁶ Distributing this cost out over 6 years would require EU member states to improve collectively their total defense contribution to approximately \$200 billion. This would amount to a 0.02 percent GDP increase, or an overall 1.9 percent GDP EU contribution.²⁷

A defense budget increase of even this magnitude could be difficult to obtain from the capitals of Europe, where the political will for this program appears to be lacking. Expensive domestic and social spending programs are entrenched across the continent and Europeans generally are not convinced of a looming and gathering threat that necessitates any increase in defense spending. Moreover, the underwhelming European economic outlook appears poised to complicate further the fiduciary plan to achieve a common security policy.

The economies of Europe are lackluster, and the prospects of sustained recovery are muted for the near future.²⁸ These economic realities are forcing EU member states to examine carefully how they commit their finite resources. On the domestic front, two issues will dominate

the economies of Europe over the next quarter century: an aging population base coupled with a declining birth rate, and a substantial social welfare program. A United Nations study on the demographics of Europe details that for the foreseeable future Europe will undergo negative population growth and experience a massive growth in pensioners, with retirees making up 30 percent of the European population at times.²⁹ This outlay, coupled with the colossal social welfare programs enacted throughout Europe will force EU member states to weigh cautiously military spending against the domestic bills that are set to come due over the next 50 years.

With a “guns versus butter” debate stirring across Europe, the concept of collective security must be examined. Currently, most EU member states are saddled with maintaining Cold War era national defense forces. This inefficient system is based primarily on the NATO collective defense model. Additionally, this obsolete arrangement encourages member states to invest largely in “backward looking” military systems; tanks, artillery, and large surface ships.³⁰ Yet, the threat of the 21st century, as outlined by ESS, is not state-on-state conflict, but global terrorism, WMD, non-state actors, and regional instability. These strategic threats require an ESDP force that is technical, modular, and sustainable. Furthermore, for operations at the high end of the Petersberg spectrum, a more robust strategic transportation capability coupled with improved tactical firepower is essential.³¹ In a collective security association, the EU member states would pool their resources and invest in a smaller, but more modern expeditionary military force, in this case the EU Rapid Reaction Force, that would guarantee their joint security. This arrangement would position EU to counter common European threats and to operate across the continuum of conflict resolution. Moreover, the collective security model will be more cost effective over the long term, producing cost benefits for EU member states. The security challenges of this century will likely remain unpredictable. As a consequence, EU member states must gradually relinquish some of their national sovereignty in order to form a collective European security system.³²

For the EU RRF to be a credible independent military force, able to enhance European regional and international security, it must be resourced to conduct operations in the 21st century. In October 2002, Dr. Klaus Scharioth, State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, put it bluntly, “The fate of the ESDP project hinges on reaching our targets and putting our resources where our mouths are.”³³ Funding this force and maintaining the well-established European social structure will be challenging. To afford both programs the leaders of Europe must consider committing to a collective security system. Adopting this security model will require the member states to forgo their long standing commitment to territorial protection and commit to a smaller but more modern expeditionary military force that would ensure their

collective security. Failure to invest properly in the EU RRF will predictably create a hollow military force with pervasive capability shortfalls. An under-funded ESDP unable to accomplish the objectives of ESS will not enhance the regional and global security of Europe. Moreover a tepid ESDP will have the unintended consequence of creating a strategic Paper Tiger, appearing elaborate but lacking any real substance.

Defense Decision Making

Efficient decision making in a supranational organization can be very difficult and complex. Member states often have differing national interests and goals which negatively impact on consensus. Paradoxically, national security and military decisions predominantly require clear, crisp decisions made by strong leaders, usually in a rapidly evolving crisis. In order to operate and employ effectively a common European security policy, the EU must commit itself to creating institutions and decision making procedures in support of ESS. This section will research the EU decision making structures and establish whether EU can effectively manage the complex decisions of security.

The EU uses a unique decision making arrangement that is unlike any other supranational organization. NATO, for example, is a military alliance centered on a combined military command that is subordinate to an intergovernmental headquarters, the North Atlantic Council.³⁴ In contrast, the EU is empowered with different governing modes for different strategy areas affecting the member states. The customary model of policy making within the EU is the joint decision model. In this forum, the European Commission (EC) acting under the qualified-majority voting (QMV) rules and in concert with the European Parliament (EP) directs and regulates the legislative process of the organization.³⁵ Within this framework, the European Commission plays a critical role setting and implementing the organizations political agenda. The Commission actively seeks to foster consensus among the member states on difficult issues before the Union or, in other words, acts as an honest broker among members.³⁶ Furthermore, under this pillar member states cede some sovereignty to the supranational EU streamlining decision making.³⁷ An active European Commission, working within the QMV framework, ensures policy making within the "first pillar" of the European Community is practical. The EU intentionally utilizes this bureaucratic model to deepen the economic, political and legal unity of the member states.

The decision making procedures of the Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union also follows the traditional practice of seeking resolution within a common institutional framework shared by all participants.³⁸ However, the CFSP intergovernmental

decision making system is based on an agreement of unanimity, where each member state is ensured a veto vote over any decision made by the organization³⁹. As outlined in Article 23 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU), decisions on the use of force must be made unanimously, where abstentions do not prevent the adoption of a decision.⁴⁰ Furthermore, all ESDP related negotiations are conducted only among member states where the role of the European Commission is restricted to merely observer status.⁴¹ In theory, member states, whose ESDP contributions are limited, could veto or delay important security decision involving larger members, and the honest broker European Commission would not be allowed to assist in negotiations.

The ESDP decision making protocol is further complicated by the difficulty of consensus among member states on security priorities and employment of military force. Although the ESS does ground breaking work in defining the threats and common security objectives of the EU, the ways and means of implementing these policies are still under great debate in Europe. Differences in security priorities characterize deliberations over, for instance, whether ESDP priority should be placed on the soft Petersberg Tasks of humanitarian relief and peacekeeping or the harder task of peace-making. Similarly there seems to be no clear agreement over whether ESDP's role is exclusively invested in regional stability or expanded globally to increase the EU's political weight. EU member states share a common region and have common security goals, but their defense attitudes range from neutrality, with Sweden who last fought a war in 1813, to Finland, who will not participate in peace making operations, to Britain and France who are organized and structured to operate in the hard power end of the Petersburg spectrum.⁴²

Another core element of effective defense decision making is strong leadership in the form of some executive organization.⁴³ To overcome the unanimity clause outlined in the TEU and to build consensus among the various defense policy orientations of the EU's member states, clear decisive leadership in ESDP is mandatory. In NATO this strong leadership role is regularly played by the U.S. who guides the transatlantic alliance to decisions, even if some member states are hesitant or in disagreement. In EU this leadership role is undefined. The primary reason for this ambiguity is that the EU presidency is rotated among member states every six months. This revolving door leadership model throws a great deal of instability into the CFSP decision making process. For each semi-annual rotation, the security priorities, regional focus and primary issues facing EU are reshuffled to suit the needs of the new president and his staff. Additionally, there is great disparity among the member states on how they resource and administer to the EU presidency. When a large member state, say the United Kingdom, assumes the leadership role, it fully outfits the staff with national administrative resources and

aggressively operates the ESDP institution. In contrast, when a smaller member state, such as Finland, assumes the EU presidency, it struggles to resource the office and relies on other member states to assist it with staffing actions.⁴⁴

Efficient decision making in a multinational organization is very difficult and complex. To ensure ESDP is successful, the EU member states must agree on a decision making model that balances both their dedication to sovereignty and their need for an efficient decision making process. Adopting an efficient process is all the more important in the security arena, where decisions are difficult, time sensitive and expensive. The EU has selected the intergovernmental agreement model to guide ESDP decisions. In this system of unanimity, where each member state is ensured a veto vote over any decision made by the organization, inherent debate and indecision usually conflict with quick decisive action. Moreover, the model relegates the European Commission to observer status reducing the possibility of negotiating compromise between members on difficult security issues. Finally, EU lacks clear executive mechanism or organ for effective leadership. With a rotating presidency, which has no authority on the use of force, the intergovernmental decision making framework becomes even more complex. Taken collectively, EU appears headed toward implementing a decision making system that is hardly a recipe for success. An EU that cannot make timely security decisions will lose global credibility and undermine the security of Europe. Worse, the U.S. may ignore the EU during crises.

Strategic ESDP Vision of the "Big Three" in EU

Adopting and implementing a defense and security policy in Europe will require the three major EU member states, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to share a common strategic perspective on ESDP. The "big three" in the EU have agreed in principal to the general security threats and objectives outlined in the ESS. Still these member states, based on diverse historical experiences, wide ranging governmental systems and differing geographical locations, disagree significantly on the means and ends to satisfy the ESS objectives. There is still considerable debate among the three nations on NATO primacy, national force structures, use of force, and relations with the United States.⁴⁵ Failure to resolve these important issues soon could spell disaster for the ESDP. This chapter will examine the geo-political and military relationship among France, Germany and the United Kingdom and determine its influence on the strategic role of ESDP. Can these member states come to a common agreement on the role of ESDP, or will the strain of their relationships imperil the success of the ESDP initiative?

After the St Malo Summit in December of 1998, the triumvirate of European powers appeared to be in universal agreement on the need for a collective military capacity within the

EU framework. Not wanting to lose momentum, the leaders of Europe continued to develop the common strategic security policy for the continent, even though some of the more difficult political and strategic issues were still unresolved. The assumption was made amongst the big three that once ESDP was operational, the strategic security dialogue would inevitably follow.⁴⁶ World events on “9/11” forced that security debate on Europe. The war on terrorism and the subsequent U.S. led invasion of Iraq pressed the powers of Europe to deliberate and define a common security strategy. However, the differentiated responses across the EU member states made clear that, at times of serious crisis, national security overrides the sanguine rhetoric of European solidarity and cooperation.⁴⁷ The conflicts led to profound divisions within the EU across several political and security topics including: the role of soft and hard power, out of area operations versus EU domestic employment, and defining the EU security relationship with the U.S. and NATO. On one hand there was a contingent led by Britain, Poland and Spain willing to join the invading coalition and use military force to combat terrorism. On the other hand there was a group, led by France, Germany and Belgium that argued that EU security issues should be determined without resorting to military force, and without succumbing to pressure from the U.S. coalition. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would label the divide, “new” and “old Europe”, and implement a strategy of *divide et impera* to manage the powers of Europe.⁴⁸

For the better part of 30 years Paris and Washington have passionately debated the proper framework to define U.S. and European security relations. The United States has long defended a transatlantic-based alliance, anchored on NATO and under U.S. leadership. The French have longed for a Europe liberated from U.S. dominance and built on the principle of counterweight.⁴⁹ During the Cold War years, the debate was suppressed to protect common security concerns. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the creation of ESDP, Paris once again is challenging the transatlantic security framework. French President Jacques Chirac openly embraces his Gaullist roots and espouses the counterweight thesis. In a speech to the Assembly of Atlantic Societies in October 19, 1999, President Chirac noted:

In every meeting with our European partners I observe a new state of mind, summarized in one wish: that Europe may be able to enlarge its voice in the administration of world affairs and above all in our continent's affairs. That it may assume its responsibilities and that it may act in favor of a balanced, multipolar, and law-respecting world⁵⁰

The French counterweight theory also characterizes their relationship with NATO. The general attitude in France is that the collective security of Europe is primarily served through EU and ESDP and that NATO is secondary⁵¹. Moreover, the French consider U.S. bilateral relations with individual EU member states as unfavorable, preferring instead to limit the security

relationship to the EU and the United States. French leaders believe that Europe will only get a global voice when it can stand on its own militarily.⁵² French Minister of Defense, Madam Michele Alliot-Marie in 2002 stated, "Europe has no foreign policy weight without the corresponding military potential."⁵³ Over the long term, France, more so than either Germany or the United Kingdom, is eager to see a united Europe develop into a global power that can rival the United States both regionally and globally.⁵⁴

The United Kingdom and the United States have maintained a close strategic relationship since World War II. Bellweather events over the decades have forced the transatlantic partners to revise their national security relationship and redefine the organizations that guarantee their strategic association. Still, London and Washington have a long-standing relationship that, since 1949, has principally been defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The "fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security" has successfully guaranteed their collective security for almost 60 years.⁵⁵

Since the late 1990s, however, the British security policy with the United States has alternated between staunch ally and European power balancer.⁵⁶ Although Britain actively supports EU and an independent ESDP, it relies mainly on a powerful NATO with primacy over ESDP to be the lynchpin of its security. Polls across Europe indicate that Europeans are somewhat more willing to invest in EU related defense projects than in NATO related projects.⁵⁷ Armed with this knowledge, British leaders believe ESDP is in part an excellent opportunity to improve the European defense pillar of NATO. Britain is convinced that the United States will take Europe much more seriously if its military capacity within NATO is upgraded. It follows that if the British are the instruments of this European improvement, their standing with the United States will rise and their strategic security will improve.⁵⁸

Because of its geo-strategic position, Britain actively supports continued U.S. participation in continental security issues. The United Kingdom tends to influence through dialogue, American security policies, oftentimes at the risk of its own isolation from the continent.⁵⁹ Tony Blair in a 1999 speech said that U.S. involvement in global security issues "is something we have no right to take for granted and must match with our own efforts."⁶⁰ The long term security of the United Kingdom is defined by a strong NATO alliance that works in cooperation with ESDP, and by continued strong ties with the United States.

For the first time in centuries, Germany is surrounded on all sides by allied states and faces no threat to its territories from bellicose neighbors.⁶¹ These improving security conditions have allowed the German leaders to reassess their strategic security goals and debate the commitment of resources to security. At the 2005 Munich Security Conference German

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted that NATO "is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies."⁶² Moreover, Schroeder also expressed great concern about "the dialogue between the European Union and the United States which in its current form does justice neither to the Union's growing importance nor the new demands for transatlantic cooperation."⁶³ As Europe's largest economic power, Germany is an important political and security actor in the EU, but its "diplomacy is constrained by its historical past and its military power is constrained by treaty."⁶⁴ Furthermore, Germany recognizes that the EU and the United States must have a relationship based on mutual respect and a common understanding of the security objectives on each side of the Atlantic. Traditionally, Germany is the swing vote amongst the big three of the EU. On one hand, Germany allies itself with Britain in holding that NATO is the prime sponsor of European security. On the other hand, Germany teams with France in believing that ESDP is vital in promoting a common European foreign policy. The long term security of Germany is based on an evolving relationship with NATO and ESDP, and this formula is highly dependent on the elected political party in power.

At the outset of the ESDP initiative, the triumvirates had general agreement on developing and implementing a collective European security. But the strain of "9/11" and the fissure of the war in Iraq seem to have tarnished the common ESDP concept. The three controlling powers of the EU, Britain, Germany, and France, on the surface have collective security goals, but behind the scenes national interests seem to be paramount. Failure of the big three to agree on NATO primacy, national force structures, use of force, and relations with the United States does not bode well for the transnational ESDP. If in times of crisis the major powers of Europe cannot come to agreement, and swift decisive action is replaced with debate and bickering, the ESDP will be labeled "EUnuch", long on talk but short on deed.

Conclusion

The European Union (EU) has dedicated itself to developing a common foreign and security policy for Europe. This novel strategic security program, ESDP, has been chartered to promote and manage the EU's global and regional security programs. This paper analyzed the ESDP initiative and its affect on global and regional European security.

The rapidly globalizing world of the 21st century requires nations to reevaluate their security strategy and alliances. For almost 60 years security within Europe, Canada and the United States has been dominated by NATO. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, instability in the Balkans and an ongoing global war on terror, the powers of Europe are reexamining their common security relationship. In light of these changes, the European Union (EU) has

committed itself to building ESDP, a common foreign and security policy for Europe. On the surface this initiative appears powerful, promising Europe a larger autonomous role in regional security and providing the continent with an independent credible hard power option. However on closer examination, some major funding and policy issues appear to be unresolved.

For ESDP to be credible it must be adequately resourced. The leaders of Europe have two principal options to fund their initiative: increase individual national defense outlays or embrace collective security in earnest. Neither option is very popular in Europe. Without a military enforcement function, it appears the EU will create a chimeric force that is burdened with persistent capability and technology shortfalls. An under-funded ESDP will not enhance the regional and global security of Europe.

Efficient decision making in multinational organization is difficult and complex. To ensure ESDP is successful, it must adopt an efficient decision making model. The Europeans selected the intergovernmental agreement model to guide their ESDP decisions.⁶⁵ This decision system, based on unanimity, usually ends with debate and indecision overwhelming quick resolute action. Moreover, the model does not adequately address a role for executive leadership in decision making. ESDP is headed toward implementing a decision making system that is hardly a framework for success. A security organization that cannot make timely decisions will lose global credibility and undermine the security of Europe.

The three major political and military powers of Europe, the U.K., Germany, and France on the surface have common security goals, but behind the scenes national interests seem to be paramount. Failure of the big three to agree on NATO primacy, national force structures, use of force, and relations with the United States does not bode well for the transnational ESDP. If in times of crisis the major powers of Europe cannot come to agreement, and swift decisive action is replaced with debate, ESDP will fail.

Unless the EU makes some financial and policy changes, ESDP will fail to accomplish its strategic goals. The recently published ESS clearly outlines the security objectives of a common Europe. However, on examination it appears the ways and means currently adopted to achieve these objectives are not in balance. To achieve success the EU must readdress the resources and policies of ESDP.

Recommendations

The United States cannot accomplish a large measure of its national security goals without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Europe. To realize success the United States must carefully balance and maintain its security relationship with both NATO and

the European Union.⁶⁶ As the EU's ESDP initiative progresses toward its goal of a common European Security Strategy the United States can facilitate the success of ESDP.

The United States should work closely with NATO and the EU to develop a collective security plan for Europe. This arrangement will create a smaller, but more modern expeditionary military force that would ensure the joint security of Europe and position the EU to counter common European threats across the continuum of conflict resolution. Moreover, the collective security model is more cost effective over the long term producing financial and security benefits for EU member states.

The United States must continue to support a strong NATO alliance, but should also fully endorse the ESDP initiative. In the National Security Strategy of 2002, President Bush notes on ESDP that, "we cannot afford to lose this opportunity to better prepare the family of transatlantic democracies for the challenged to come."⁶⁷ American leaders should look on ESDP as an opportunity to improve the military capacity of Europe and strengthen the defense pillar of both NATO and the EU.

Finally, the United States must continue to maintain strong military and political relations with Great Britain and Germany. The security of the United States and Europe is manifested in a strong NATO alliance that works in close cooperation with ESDP. The security policy goals of the United States, Germany and Great Britain are and should remain closely aligned.

Endnotes

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¹⁷ Ibid, 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

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²¹ Solana, 7-8.

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²⁴ Gustav Lindstrom, "EU-US burdensharing: who does what?," *Chaillot Paper no 82* (September 2005): 28.

²⁵ Ralph Thiele, "Projecting European Power: A European View," in *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role*, ed. Esther Brimmer (Washington D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 78.

²⁶ Charles Wolf, Jr. and Benjamin Zycher, *European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force* (RAND 2001), 32; available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1416/index.html>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2005.

²⁷ Millen, 18.

²⁸ Simon Serfaty, *The United States, The European Union, and NATO: After the Cold War and Beyond Iraq* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 4.

²⁹ deCamp, 12.

³⁰ Wolf and Zycher, 33.

³¹ Thiele, 78.

³² Gerd Fohrenbach, "Security Through Engagement: The Worldwide Underlying ESDP," in *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role*, ed. Esther Brimmer (Washington D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 18.

³³ Dr. Klaus Scharioth, "Making ESDP Strong Will Strengthen NATO and the Transatlantic Partnership – Afterword", ed. Esther Brimmer (Washington D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 171.

³⁴ Fohrenbach, 5

³⁵ Fritz Scharpf, "Legitimate Diversity: The New Challenge of European Integration," ZSE, January 2005 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.degruyter.de/journals/zse/pdf/1_32.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 December 2005.

Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is a voting procedure employed in the Council of the European Union for some decisions. According to the procedure, each member state has a fixed number of votes. The number allocated to each country is roughly determined by its population, but progressively weighted in favor of smaller countries. To pass a vote by QMV, all three of the following conditions must apply: First, the proposal must be supported by 232 out of the total of 321 votes (72.27%); Second, the proposal must be backed by a majority of member states; and Third, the countries supporting the proposal must represent at least 62% of the total EU population.

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⁴³ Menon, 208.

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⁴⁸ Biscop, 6.

⁴⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, "Rethinking the EU: Why Washington needs to Support European Integration," *Survival*, vol. 47 no. 3(Autumn 2005); 95.

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⁵³ Ibid.

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⁵⁸ ibid, 19.

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⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Posen, 20.

⁶⁵ Scharpf, 39.

⁶⁶ Bush, 25.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 26.